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Abstract
Machine Learning (ML) algorithms are vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where a
fraction of the training data is manipulated to deliberately degrade the algorithms’
performance. Optimal poisoning attacks, which can be formulated as bilevel
optimisation problems, help to assess the robustness of learning algorithms in worst-
case scenarios. However, current attacks against algorithms with hyperparameters
typically assume that these hyperparameters remain constant ignoring the effect the
attack has on them. We show that this approach leads to an overly pessimistic view
of the robustness of the algorithms. We propose a novel optimal attack formulation
that considers the effect of the attack on the hyperparameters by modelling the
attack as a multiobjective bilevel optimisation problem. We apply this novel attack
formulation to ML classifiers using L2 regularisation and show that, in contrast to
results previously reported, L2 regularisation enhances the stability of the learning
algorithms and helps to mitigate the attacks. Our empirical evaluation on different
datasets confirms the limitations of previous strategies, evidences the benefits of
using L2 regularisation to dampen the effect of poisoning attacks and shows how
the regularisation hyperparameter increases with the fraction of poisoning points.
1 Introduction
In many applications, Machine Learning (ML) systems rely on data collected from untrusted data
sources, such as humans, machines, sensors, or IoT devices that can be compromised and manipulated.
Malicious data from these compromised sources can then be used to poison the learning algorithms
themselves. In other applications, the labelling of the training datasets is done manually and
crowdsourcing techniques are used to aggregate the labelling information from a set of human
annotators. In these cases, crowdturfing attacks are possible where malicious annotators collude to
deceive the crowdsourcing algorithm by manipulating some of the labels of the annotated examples
[41]. All these scenarios expose ML algorithms to poisoning attacks, where adversaries manipulate a
fraction of the training data to subvert the learning process, either to decrease its overall performance
or to produce a particular kind of error in the system [2, 16, 25]. Poisoning attacks can also facilitate
subsequent evasion attacks or produce backdoor (or Trojan) attacks [15, 21].
Several systematic poisoning attacks have already been proposed to analyse different families of
ML algorithms under worst-case scenarios, including Support Vector Machines (SVMs) [4], other
linear classifiers [38, 23, 19], and neural networks [18, 24]. These attack strategies are formulated as
a bilevel optimisation problem, i.e. an optimisation problem that depends on another optimisation
problem. In these cases, the attacker typically aims to maximise some arbitrary malicious objective
(e.g. to maximise the error for a set of target points) by manipulating a fraction of the training data.
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At the same time, the defender aims to optimise a different objective function to learn the model’s
parameters, typically by minimising some loss function evaluated on the poisoned training set.
Some of the previous attacks target algorithms that have hyperparameters, but consider them constant
regardless of the fraction of poisoning points injected in the training dataset. This can provide a
misleading analysis of the robustness of the algorithms against such attacks, as the value of the
hyperparameters can change depending on the type and strength of the attack. For example, Xiao
et al. [38] presented a poisoning attack against embedded feature selection methods, including L1,
L2 and elastic-net regularisation. Their experimental results show that the attacker can completely
control the selection of the features to significantly increase the overall test error of linear classifiers.
However, they assume a constant regularisation hyperparameter regardless of the attack scenario
considered. As shown in this paper, this approach can provide overly pessimistic results on the
ML algorithms’ robustness to poisoning attacks, as the value of the regularisation hyperparameters
significantly changes (if they are optimised) when malicious points are injected in the training set.
In this paper we propose a novel and more general poisoning attack formulation to test worst-case
scenarios against ML algorithms that contain hyperparameters. For this, we model the attack as a
multiobjective bilevel optimisation problem, where the outer objective includes both the learning of
the poisoning points and the hyperparameters of the model, whereas the inner problem involves the
learning of the model’s parameters. In a worst-case scenario, where the attacker is aware of the dataset
used to learn the model’s hyperparameters and aims to maximise the overall error, the outer objective
can be modelled as a minimax problem. We applied our proposed attack formulation to test the
robustness of ML classifiers that use L2 regularisation. We used hypergradient (i.e. the gradient in the
outer problem [22, 10, 11]) descent/ascent to solve the proposed multiobjective bilevel optimisation
problem. As the computation of the exact hypergradients can be very expensive, especially for
neural networks, we used Reverse-Mode Differentiation (RMD) [8, 22, 24, 11] to approximate the
aforementioned hypergradients. Our experimental evaluation shows that, contrary to the results
reported in [38], L2 regularisation helps as a mechanism to partially mitigate the effect of poisoning
attacks. This is not surprising, as L2 regularisation is known to increase the stability of the learning
algorithm, and thus, can hinder the ability of the attacker to poison the target algorithm. We show
that the value of the regularisation hyperparameter increases with the strength of the attack. In other
words, the algorithm automatically tries to compensate the negative effect of the poisoning points
by increasing the strength of the regularisation term. Our proposed attack formulation allows us to
appropriately evaluate the robustness of L2 regularisation in worst-case scenarios.
2 Related Work
The first poisoning attacks reported in the literature targeted specific applications, such as spam
filtering [27, 2] or anomaly detection [3, 17]. A more systematic approach was introduced in [4] to
poison SVMs, modelling the attack as a bilevel optimisation problem. Subsequent works extended
this approach to other families of ML algorithms, including linear and other convex classifiers [23]
or embedded feature selection methods [38]. A more general approach was introduced in [24]
formulating different optimal attack strategies for targeting multiclass classifiers. The authors also
proposed an algorithm to estimate the hypergradients in the corresponding bilevel optimisation
problem through RMD, which significantly improves the scalability of optimal attacks, allowing
to poison a broader range of learning algorithms, including neural networks. The authors in [19]
proposed an algorithm for solving bilevel optimisation problems with detectability constraints,
allowing to craft poisoning points that can bypass outlier detectors. However, the algorithm is
computationally demanding, which limits its applicability in many practical scenarios.
Other approaches have also been proposed for crafting poisoning attacks: Koh et al. [18] created
adversarial training examples by exploiting influence functions. This approach allows to craft
successful targeted attacks by injecting small perturbations to genuine data points in the training set.
Shafahi et al. [34] proposed a targeted attack for situations where the adversary does not control
the labels for the poisoning points. A Generative Adversarial Net-based model to craft poisoning
attacks at scale against deep networks was proposed in [26]. This approach allows to model naturally
detectability constraints for the attacker, enabling attacks with different levels of aggressiveness.
On the defender’s side, it is possible to mitigate poisoning attacks by analysing the samples that can
have a negative impact on the target algorithms [27]. However, this approach can be impractical in
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many applications, as it offers a poor scalability. Similarly, in [18], the use of influence functions is
proposed as a mechanism to detect poisoning points. Different outlier detection schemes have proved
to be effective to mitigate poisoning attacks in cases where the attacker does not model appropriate
detectability constraints [36, 28]. Label sanitisation has also been proposed as a mechanism to identify
and relabel suspicious training points [29, 42]. However, this strategy can fail in attacks where the
poisoning points collude [26]. Finally, Diakonikolas et al. [7] proposed a robust meta-algorithm,
based on Singular Value Decomposition, capable of mitigating some poisoning attacks.
3 General Optimal Poisoning Attacks
In data poisoning attacks the attacker can tamper with a fraction of the training data points to
manipulate the behaviour of the learning algorithm [3, 2]. We assume that the attacker can manipulate
all the features and the label of the injected poisoning points, provided that the resulting points are
within a feasible domain of valid data points. We consider white-box attacks with perfect knowledge,
i.e. the attacker knows everything about the target system, including the training data, the feature
representation, the loss function, the ML model, and the defence (if applicable) used by the victim.
Although unrealistic in most cases, these assumptions for the adversary allow us to analyse the
robustness of the ML algorithms in worst-case scenarios for attacks with different strength.
3.1 Problem Formulation
In line with most literature on poisoning attacks we consider ML classifiers. Then, in a classification
task, given the input space X ∈ Rm and the label space, Y , the learner aims to estimate the
mapping f : X → Y . Given a training set Dtr = {(xtri , ytri)}ntri=1 with ntr IID samples drawn
from the underlying probability distribution p(X ,Y), we can estimate f with a modelM trained
by minimising an objective function L(Dtr,Λ,w) w.r.t. its parameters1, w ∈ Rd, given a set of
hyperparameters Λ ∈ Rc.
We assume that the defender has access to a small validation dataset Dval = {(xvalj , yvalj )}nvalj=1 with
nval trusted data points. In practical settings it is not uncommon to have access to a limited clean
dataset, e.g. because the integrity of a small set of data sources can be ascertained or because
the system is re-calibrated at specific points in time. This small clean dataset is held out for
hyperparameter optimisation. Then, as proposed in [9], the model’s hyperparameters can be learned
by solving the following bilevel optimisation problem:
min
Λ∈Φ(Λ)
L(Dval,w?)
s.t. w? ∈ arg min
w∈W
L (Dtr,Λ,w) , (1)
where Φ(Λ) represent the feasible domain set for the hyperparameters Λ. On the other side, in a
poisoning attack, the adversary aims to inject a set of np malicious data points,Dp = {(xpk , ypk)}
np
k=1,
in the training dataset to maximise some arbitrary objective, A, evaluated on a set of target data
points Dtarget. As described in [24] different attack scenarios can be considered depending on both
the set of target data points and the attacker’s objective, including indiscriminate and targeted attacks.
In these settings, we propose to formulate the problem for the attacker as the multiobjective bilevel
optimisation problem:
min
Λ∈Φ(Λ)
L(Dval, w?), maxDp∈Φ(Dp)A(Dtarget,w
?)
s.t. w? ∈ arg min
w∈W
L (D′tr,Λ,w) ,
(2)
where D′tr = Dtr ∪ Dp is the poisoned dataset and Φ(Dp) is the feasible domain for the attacker.
Previous work in the research literature have neglected the effect of the hyperparameters in the
problem for the attacker, e.g. the regularisation hyperparameter for the cost function for SVMs [4]
or for embedded feature selection methods [38]. From the general formulation we propose in (2) it
1As in [22], we use parameters to denote “parameters that are just parameters and not hyperparameters”.
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Figure 1: Effect of regularisation on a synthetic example. The blue and green points represent the
training data points for each class, and the red point is the poisoning point (labelled as green). The
dashed-dotted grey box represent the attacker’s constraints. Dashed-white lines and solid-red lines
depict the decision boundaries for LR classifiers trained on clean and poisoned datasets respectively.
(Left) Standard LR with no regularisation. (Centre) LR with L2 regularisation. The colour-maps in
the two plots represent the validation error as a function of the poisoning point. (Right) Value of λ
learned by solving (1) as a function of the injected poisoning point.
is clear that the poisoning points in D′tr have an effect not only on the parameters of the classifier,
but also on its hyperparameters. Then, testing the robustness of the learning algorithms with attacks
that ignore this effect can produce misleading results, as we show, for example, in the synthetic
experiment in Fig. 1 for the case of L2 regularisation. By ignoring the effect on the hyperparameters,
these attacks overestimate the adversary’s capabilities to influence the learning algorithm.
Our novel attack formulation in (2) allows to model a wide variety of attack scenarios, depending on
the attacker’s objective and the combinations between the target, validation and training data points.
In the remainder of the paper we will focus on analysing worst-case scenarios for indiscriminate
poisoning attacks, i.e. those where the attacker—which has perfect knowledge—aims to increase the
overall classification error in the target system. To achieve such a goal, the attacker aims to maximise
the loss evaluated on the defender’s validation set, i.e. A(Dtarget,w?) = L(Dval, w?). Then, the
problem for the attacker can also be formulated as a bilevel optimisation problem where the outer
objective is a minimax problem:
min
Λ∈Φ(Λ)
max
Dp∈Φ(Dp)
L(Dval,w?)
s.t. w? ∈ arg min
w∈W
L (D′tr,Λ,w) .
(3)
None of previous approaches described in the research literature have modelled attacks as multiobjec-
tive bilevel optimisation problems as in (2) and (3). Beyond the scope of our paper, our approach can
also be useful to test the robustness of defensive algorithms to data poisoning in worst-case scenarios
when those algorithms contain hyperparameters.
3.2 Solving General Optimal Poisoning Attacks
Solving the multiobjective bilevel optimisation problems in (2) and (3) is strongly NP-Hard [1] and,
even if the inner problem is convex, the bilevel problem is, in general, non-convex. However, it is
possible to use gradient-based approaches to get (possibly) suboptimal solutions, i.e. finding local
optima for the problem in (2) and saddle points for the minimax problem in (3). For the sake of
clarity, in the remainder we will focus on the solution for the problem (3), as we shall use it in our
experiments to show the robustness of L2 regularisation to indiscriminate poisoning attacks. The
solution of (2) follows a similar procedure.
To compute the hypergradients for the outer objective, we assume that the loss function, L, is convex
and its first and second derivatives are Lipschitz-continuous functions. Similar to [4, 23, 38, 24]
we assume that the label of the poisoning points is set a priori, so the attacker just needs to learn
the features for the poisoning points, Xp. For the sake of clarity, in the following description we
shall use A to denote the loss function evaluated on Dval in the outer objective, i.e. L(Dval,w?), and
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L to refer to the loss function evaluated on D′tr in the inner objective, i.e. L(D′tr,Λ,w?); both are
evaluated on the optimal solution w? of the inner problem. We can compute the hypergradients in the
outer problem by leveraging the conditions for stationarity in the inner problem, i.e. ∇wL = 0, and
applying the implicit function theorem [23]. Then, the hypergradients can be computed as:
∇XpA = −
(∇Xp∇wL)T (∇2wL)−1∇wA, ∇ΛA = − (∇Λ∇wL)T (∇2wL)−1∇wA, (4)
where we assume that the Hessian ∇2wL is not singular. Brute-force computation of (4) requires
inverting the Hessian, which scales in time as O(d3) and in space as O(d2)—where d is the dimen-
sionality of the parameters. However, as in [9], we can rearrange the terms in the second part of (4)
and solve first the linear system:
(∇2wL)v = ∇wA, and compute∇XpA = − (∇Xp∇wL)T v.2 The
linear system can be efficiently solved by using conjugate gradient descent. Moreover, Hessian-vector
products can be computed exactly and efficiently with the technique proposed in [30], avoiding the
computation and storage of the Hessian (for further details, see Appendix A).
However, the previous approach requires training the whole learning algorithm to compute the
hypergradient. This can be intractable for some learning algorithms such as deep networks, where
the number of parameters is huge. To sidestep this problem, different techniques have been proposed
to estimate the value of the hypergradients [8, 22, 31, 10, 24, 11]. These techniques do not require to
re-train the learning algorithm every time the hypergradient is computed. Instead, they estimate the
hypergradient by truncating the learning in the inner problem to a reduced number of epochs.
Depending on the order in which the operations are computed, we differentiate two approaches
to estimate the hypergradients: Reverse-Mode (RMD) and Forward-Mode Differentiation (FMD)
[14, 10]. In the first case, RMD requires to first train the learning algorithm for T epochs. Then, the
hypergradients estimate is computed by reversing the steps followed by the learning algorithm. In
some cases, RMD requires to store all the information collected in the trajectory of the parameters.
This can be prohibitive for deep networks where the number of parameters is huge. However, other
RMD methods proposed do not require to store this information [22, 24]. In contrast, FMD computes
the hypergradients estimate as the algorithm is trained. However, the scalability of FMD depends
heavily on the number of hyperparameters compared to RMD. So, for problems where the number of
hyperparameters is large, as is the case for the poisoning attacks we introduced in (2) and (3), RMD
is computationally more efficient. Hence, we used RMD in our experiments. Moreover, compared to
grid search, these gradient-based techniques allow reducing the computational cost, as the algorithm
does not need to be trained completely and evaluated for each combination of hyperparameters.
Finally, once we have computed the hypergradients, at each hyperiteration we can use projected
hypergradient descent/ascent to update the value of the poisoning points and the model’s hyperparam-
eters:
Xp ← ΠΦ(Dp)
(
Xp + α ∇XpA
)
, Λ← ΠΦ(Λ) (Λ− β ∇ΛA) , (5)
where α and β are respectively the learning rates and ΠΦ(Dp) and ΠΦ(Λ) are the projection operators
for the features of the poisoning points, Xp, and the hyperparameters, Λ, so that their updated values
are within the corresponding feasible domains, Φ(Dp) and Φ(Λ). In our case we used standard
gradient ascent/descent to solve (3). The analysis of other alternatives to solve minimax games, such
as optimistic gradient descent/ascent [6] is left for future work.
4 L2 Regularisation to Mitigate Poisoning Attacks
Poisoning attacks are intrinsically related to the stability of ML algorithms. Attackers aim to produce
large changes in the target algorithm by influencing a reduced set of training points. Xu et al. [40]
introduced the following definition of stability: “an ML algorithm is stable if its output is nearly
identical on two datasets, differing on only one sample." This concept of stability has also been
studied in the field of robust statistics, in which robustness formally denotes this notion of stability
[32]. It is not our intention here to provide a formal analysis on the stability of the ML algorithms,
2 The resulting expression for the case of Λ is analogous.
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but to show that stability is an important property for the design of ML algorithms robust to data
poisoning. For instance, in [26] it was shown empirically that for the same fraction of attack points,
the effect of a poisoning attack reduces when the number of training points increases, as the stability of
the algorithm increases. Thus, data augmentation can help to limit the attacker’s ability to degrade the
overall system’s performance, leading to significant improvements in generalisation [35]. However
data augmentation may not be as effective to defend against more targeted attacks or backdoors.
L2 (or Tikhonov) regularisation is a well-known mechanism to increase the stability of ML algorithms
[40]. In L2 regularisation we add a penalty term to the original loss function which shrinks the
norm of the model’s parameters, so that L(Dtr,Λ,w) = L(Dtr,w) + eλ2 ||w||22 , where λ is the
hyperparameter that controls the strength of the regularisation term. The exponential form is used to
ensure a positive contribution of the regularisation term for the loss function and to help learning
λ, for example by using (1), as this hyperparameter is usually searched over a log-spaced grid [31].
Different L2 regularisation schemes can be considered: e.g., in neural networks, we could have one
regularisation term for the parameters at each layer or even a different term for each parameter [9].
Xiao et al. [38] analysed the robustness of embedded feature selection, including L2 regularisation,
for linear classifiers against optimal poisoning attacks. Although their experimental results showed
that L2 was slightly more robust compared to L1 regularisation and elastic-net, all the classifiers
tested where significantly vulnerable to indiscriminate optimal poisoning attacks. However, these
results relied on the assumption that the regularisation hyperparameter was constant regardless of the
fraction of poisoning data. This approach can produce misleading results, as the poisoning points can
have a significant effect on the value of the hyperparameter learned, for example by using (1).
In Fig. 1 we show a synthetic example with a binary classifier to illustrate the limitations of the
approach considered in [38]. Here, 32 points for the two classes (16 per class) were drawn from
two different bivariate Gaussian distributions and we trained a Logistic Regression (LR) classifier.
Fig. 1(left) shows the effect of injecting a single poisoning point (red point, labelled as green) that
aims to maximise the error (measured on a separate validation set with 64 data points) against an LR
classifier with no regularisation.3 The dashed-white line represents the decision boundary learned
when training on the clean dataset, whereas the red line depicts the decision boundary of the LR
trained on the poisoned dataset. We can observe that a single poisoning point can significantly alter
the decision boundary. Fig. 1(centre), shows a similar scenario, but training an LR classifier with L2
regularisation, setting λ = log(20) ≈ 3. Here, we can observe that the effect of the poisoning point
on the classifier is much reduced and the decision boundary shifts only slightly. In the background
of these two figures we represent the error evaluated on the validation set for the LR trained on a
poisoned dataset as a function of the location of the poisoning point. We can observe that, when
there is no regularisation (left) the error can significantly increase when we inject the poisoning point
in certain regions. On the contrary, when regularisation is applied (centre), the colour-map is more
uniform, i.e. the algorithm is quite stable regardless of the position of the poisoning point and the
increase in the validation error after the attack is very small.
Fig. 1(right) shows how the value of the regularisation hyperparameter, λ, changes as a function of the
poisoning point. The colour-map in the background represents the value of λ learned by solving (1),
i.e. the λ that minimises the error on the validation set. We can observe that λ can change significantly
depending on the position of the poisoning point. Thus, λ is much bigger for the regions where the
poisoning point can influence more the classifier (Fig. 1(left)). Then, when the poisoning attack can
have a very negative impact on the classifier’s performance, the importance of the regularisation term,
controlled by λ, increases. It is clear that selecting the value of λ appropriately can have a significant
impact on the classifier’s robustness. Furthermore, when testing the robustness of L2-regularised
classifiers we must consider the interplay between the attack strength and the value of λ.
5 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the attack strategy in (3) against LR and feed-forward
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs). For LR, we use three different binary classification problems:
MNIST (‘0’ vs ‘8’) [20], Fashion-MNIST (FMNIST) (T-shirt vs pullover) [39], and ImageNet (dog
vs fish) [33] preprocessed as in [18], where the first two datasets have 784 features, and the latter has
2, 048 features. For the DNN, we focus on ImageNet. All datasets are balanced, and for all of them
3 The details of the experiment can be found in Appendix D.2.
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Figure 2: Results for the optimal attack against LR: The first row represents the average test error on
(a) MNIST, (b) FMNIST, and (c) ImageNet. The second row contains the plots for the average λ and
||w||22 for (d) MNIST, (e) FMNIST, and (f) ImageNet.
we use 512 training and 171 validation points, drawn at random from the original pool of training
points. For testing, we use 1, 954 points for MNIST, 2, 000 for FMNIST, and 600 for ImageNet.4 All
the results in our experiments are the average of 10 repetitions with different random data splits for
training and validation, whereas the test set is fixed. For all the attacks we measure the average test
error for different attack strengths, where the number of poisoning points ranges from 0 to 85.
5.1 Logistic Regression
For LR we test the general poisoning attack strategy in (3) using the following settings for the
computation of the hypergradients with RMD. For MNIST we set T , the number of epochs for the
inner problem, to 150. For FMNIST and ImageNet we use T = 200. For comparison purposes,
we craft optimal poisoning attacks, setting the value of λ to different constant values: a very small
regularisation term (λ = −8), a very large one (λ = log(200) for MNIST, λ = log(400) for FMNIST,
and λ = log(3, 000) for ImageNet), and the value of λ optimised with 5-fold cross-validation, training
the model on the clean dataset (λCLEAN). With the small and large constant values for λ we aim to
show the trade-off between accuracy and robustness to different attack strengths. The case of λCLEAN
is similar to the settings used in [38].
The results are shown in Fig. 2(a)-(c). We can observe that for the small λ and λCLEAN the attacks are
very effective and the test error increases significantly when compared to the algorithm’s performance
on the clean dataset. In contrast, for the biggest λ the test error increases only slightly with the
increasing fraction of poisoning points, showing a stable performance regardless of the attack strength.
However, in the absence of an attack, the algorithm clearly underfits and the error is significantly
higher compared to the other models. When the value of λ is learned (λRMD), i.e. solving the problem
in (3), the increase on the test error is quite moderate and, when the ratio of poisoning points is large,
presents a similar performance as in the case where the value of λ is large. In this sense, the error
does not increase further by injecting more poisoning points. In the absence of attack, we can observe
that the performance for λRMD is as good as in the case of λCLEAN.
The results in Fig. 2(a)-(c) show that the attack and the methodology presented in [38] provide an
overly pessimistic view on the robustness of L2 regularisation to data poisoning attacks and that,
by appropriately selecting the value of λ, we can effectively reduce the impact of such attacks.
Furthermore, we can also observe that there exists a trade-off between accuracy and robustness:
4The details of the experimental setup and hardware used for the experiments can be found in Appendix D.
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Figure 3: Results for the optimal attack against the DNN on ImageNet. (a) Average test error. λRMD
represents the one learned with RMD. (b) Average λ learned with RMD. (c) Average ||wlayer||22/dlayer,
where dlayer represents the number of parameters of the corresponding layer. This normalisation
allows comparing ||wlayer||22 for each layer regardless of the number of the parameters.
over-regularising (i.e. setting a very large value for λ) makes the algorithm more robust to the attack,
but the performance is degraded when there is no attack.
In Fig. 2(d)-(f) we show the value of λ learned and the norm of the model’s parameters, ||w||22, as a
function of the fraction of poisoning points injected for the solution of problem (3) with RMD. We
can observe that in all cases, the regularisation hyperparameter increases as we increase the fraction
of poisoning points, which means that the regularisation term tries to compensate the effect of the
malicious samples on the model’s parameters. Thus, as expected, L2 provides a natural mechanism
to stabilise the model in the presence of attacks. For ImageNet, the order of magnitude of λ is higher,
as there are more features in the model. In Fig. 2(d)-(f) we can also observe that, as expected from
the properties of L2 regularisation, when λ increases, the norm of the parameters decreases.
5.2 Deep Neural Networks
For DNNs, we consider a vector of regularisation hyperparameters λ, with one hyperparameter for
each layer. Intuitively, the amount of scaling needed by each layer’s parameters to compensate for a
change in the output is not the same, given the nonlinear activation functions. This can also give us an
intuition about which layer is more vulnerable to the poisoning attack. We also propose an additional
modification to the RMD algorithm: we apply different initial random parameters w(0) for every
update of the poisoning points. This can be interpreted as assembling different randomly initialised
DNNs to improve the generalisation of the poisoning points across different parameter initialisations.
In this case we set T = 600. This scenario is much more challenging for the multiobjective bilevel
problem we aim to solve, as the model has two hidden layers (2, 048× 128× 32× 1) with Leaky
ReLU activation functions, which sums up to a total of 266, 433 parameters.
As in the previous experiment, we performed attacks with different strengths for the DNN trained
with small (λ = −8) and large (λ = log(40)) values for the regularisation hyperparameter, constant
for all the layers. In this case, we omitted the case where λ is set with 5-fold cross-validation on the
clean dataset as the search space is large, which makes it computationally very expensive. As before,
we denote with λRMD the case where the regularisation hyperparameter is learned (3). The results
in Fig. 3(a) are consistent with those obtained for the case of LR. For λ = −8 the algorithm is very
vulnerable to the poisoning attack and its test error significantly increases up to 12% when the training
dataset is poisoned with 16.6% malicious points. On the contrary, for λ = log(40) the algorithm’s
performance remains quite stable for increasing fractions of poisoning points. For λRMD the test
error increases moderately and stabilises when the fraction of poisoning points is 10%. Finally, from
Fig. 3(a) we can see that when there is no attack, the test error for λRMD is smaller than the other two
cases. As discussed before, although over-regularising may be appealing to make the algorithm more
robust to poisoning attacks, the performance in the absence of attack may be significantly worse.
In Fig. 3(b) we can observe that the λ learned for the second and output layers increase faster than the
one for the first layer. This result suggests that the latter layers are more vulnerable to the poisoning
attack. In other words, the poisoning attack tries to produce more changes in the parameters of
the network in those layers and, at the same time, the network tries to resist to those changes by
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increasing the value of the corresponding regularisation hyperparameters. Finally, in Fig. 3(c) we
show the L2 norm of the parameters for each layer divided by the number of parameters in each case.
The results are consistent with those in Fig. 3(b): The norm of the parameters in the last two layers
significantly decrease when we increase the fraction of poisoning points. On the other side, regardless
of the attack strength, the norm of the parameters is significantly bigger for the output layer.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we introduce a novel poisoning attack strategy for evaluating the robustness of ML
classifiers that contain hyperparameters in worst-case scenarios. The attack can be formulated as a
multiobjective bilevel optimisation problem that can be solved with gradient-based techniques. We
show the limitations of previous approaches, such as [4, 38], where the model’s hyperparameters are
considered constant regardless of the type and strength of the attack. As shown in our experiments,
this approach can provide a misleading (and, often, pessimistic) view of the algorithms’ robustness.
We show that these poisoning attacks can have a strong influence on the hyperparameters learned,
and thus, their influence must be considered when assessing the robustness of the algorithms.
We also show that, contrary to the results reported in [38], L2 regularisation can help to to mitigate
the effect of poisoning attacks, increasing the stability of the learning algorithms. When the attacker
increases the strength of the attack, the regularisation hyperparameter also increases to compensate
the instability that the attacker tries to produce in the algorithm. Our experimental evaluation shows
the benefits of using L2 regularisation as a good practice to reduce the impact of poisoning attacks.
We also illustrate the trade-off between robustness and accuracy as a function of the regularisation
hyperparameter. Our results highlight the importance of stability as a desired property for the design
of more robust algorithms to data poisoning. Further research work will include the analysis of attacks
in multiclass settings, other forms of regularisation, such as L1 and elastic-net, and the analysis of
the robustness to data poisoning for other learning algorithms that contains hyperparameters.
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A Hessian-Vector Products
Let x ∈ X ⊆ Rm, y ∈ Y ⊆ Rn, v ∈ Rm, and f(x, y) ∈ R. If the second partial derivatives of
f(x, y) are continuous almost everywhere5 in X and Y (mild condition), the Hessian-vector products(∇2xf(x, y)) v and (∇y∇xf(x, y))T v can be computed exactly and efficiently by using the following
identities [30]:
(∇2xf(x, y)) v = ∇x (vT∇xf(x, y)) , (∇y∇xf(x, y))T v = ∇y (vT∇xf(x, y)) . (6)
The left and right expressions scale as O(m) and O(max(m,n)), respectively, both in time and
space. Analogous expressions can be obtained when v ∈ Rn. An elegant aspect of this technique is
that, for machine learning models optimised with gradient-based methods, the equations for exactly
evaluating the Hessian-vector products emulate closely those for standard forward and backward
propagation. Hence, the application of existing automatic differentiation frameworks to compute this
product is typically straightforward [30, 5].
B Projected Hypergradient Descent/Ascent Algorithm
Alg. 1 describes the procedure to solve the multiobjective bilevel problem proposed in Sect. 3. Essen-
tially, this algorithm implements projected hypergradient descent/ascent to optimise, in a coordinate
manner, the poisoning points—replaced into the training set—and the set of hyperparameters.
Alg. 1 receives as inputsM (the target model), A and L (outer and inner objective functions), Dval
andDtr (validation and training datasets), np (number of poisoning points to optimise), P = {pk}npk=1
(indices of the np points—uniformly sampled without duplicates—of Dtr to be replaced by Dp), Tmul
and T (number of hyperiterations for the outer problem and number of epochs for the inner problem),
and α, β, and η (learning rates for the features of the poisoning points, Xp, for the hyperparameters,
Λ, and for the parameters of the inner problem, respectively). In addition, let w and Dp denote the the
model’s parameters and the labelled poisoning points, correspondingly. At the end of the algorithm,
it outputs the optimised poisoning points and hyperparameters, i.e. D(Tmul)p and Λ(Tmul). For the sake
of clarity, in the algorithms included in this appendix and the following ones we shall make use of the
following notation:
A
(
w(T )
)
= A
(
Dval,w(T )
)
= A
(
M
(
Xval,w(T )
)
, yval
)
,
L
(
w(t)
)
= L
(
D′(τ)tr ,Λ(τ),w(t)
)
= L
(
M
(
X′(τ)tr ,Λ(τ),w(t)
)
, y′tr
)
,
where Xval and X′tr are the features of the validation and poisoned training sets, and yval and y′tr are
their respective labels.
To reduce the computational burden, we consider the simultaneous optimisation of a batch of np
poisoning points,Dp = {(xpk , ypk)}
np
k=1. We generate the initial values ofDp by cloning np samples—
uniformly sampled without duplicates—ofDval. Their labels are initially flipped and kept fixed during
the optimisation. This process is carried out in the function initDp (Line 1). Then, these np poisoning
samples replace the np clean samples of Dtr whose indices are in the set P (Line 2). On the other
hand, the hyperparameters are initialised in initL (Line 3). In the case study of this paper, the
hyperparameters correspond to the regularisation ones.
In a bilevel optimisation problem, the outer problem depends on the solution of the inner problem.
Hence, in order to solve the bilevel problem, every time (hyperiteration) the variables in the outer
problem (i.e. Xp and Λ in this case) are updated, the variables in the inner problem (i.e. the model’s
parameters) need to be previously initialised and optimised. Thus, let initW (Line 5) be a particular
initialisation for the model’s parameters. hypGradXp (Line 6) and hypGradL (Line 9) refer to the
particular optimisation algorithm used to train the model’s parameters and compute the corresponding
5A property that holds almost everywhere holds throughout all space except on a set of measure zero.
Intuitively, a set of measure zero occupies a negligible volume in the measured space [13].
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Algorithm 1 Projected Hypergradient Descent/Ascent
Input:M, A, L, Dval, Dtr, np, P , Tmul, T , α, β, η
Output: D(Tmul)p , Λ(Tmul)
1: D(0)p ← initDp (Dval, np) // generate np samples for D(0)p
2: D′(0)tr ← (Dtr \ {(xtrk , ytrk)}k∈P) ∪ D(0)p // replace np samples of Dtr by D(0)p
3: Λ(0) ← initL(M) // initialise Λ
4: for τ = 0 to Tmul − 1 do
5: w(0) ← initW(M) // initialise w
6: ∇XpA
(
w(T )
)← hypGradXp(M,A,L,Dval,D′(τ)tr ,Λ(τ),w(0), T, η) // Alg. 2
7: X(τ+1)p ← ΠΦ(Dp)
(
X(τ)p + α∇XpA
(
w(T )
))
// projected hypergradient ascent
8: X′(τ+1)tr ←
(
X′(τ)tr \ X(τ)p
)
∪ X(τ+1)p // update X′(τ)tr with X(τ+1)p
9: ∇ΛA
(
w(T )
)← hypGradL(M,A,L,Dval,D′(τ+1)tr ,Λ(τ),w(0), T, η) // Alg. 2
10: Λ(τ+1) ← ΠΦ(Λ)
(
Λ(τ) − β∇ΛA
(
w(T )
))
// projected hypergradient descent
11: end for
hypergradients. In this work, this algorithm is Reverse-Mode Differentiation (RMD) (Alg. 2). Then,
ΠΦ(Dp) (Line 7) and ΠΦ(Λ) (Line 10) are the projection operators for Xp and Λ, so that their updated
values are within the corresponding feasible domains, Φ(Dp) and Φ(Λ). Line 8 updates the features
of the poisoning samples in the poisoned training set.
In our experiments, we simulate different ratios of poisoning points in a cumulative manner: Once
the optimisation of the current batch of poisoning points and hyperparameters is finished,6 this batch
of poisoning points is fixed and the next batch of poisoning points is replaced into the remaining
clean training set, to carry out their corresponding optimisation. To accelerate their optimisation, the
hypergradients for the poisoning points are normalised with respect to their L2 norm.7 Regarding
the hyperparameters, their values are updated continuously for the whole set of batches of poisoning
points.
C Reverse-Mode Differentiation Algorithm
As described in [10], we can think of the training algorithm as a discrete-time dynamical system,
described by a set of states s(t) ∈ Rds , with t = 0, . . . , T , where each state depends on model’s
parameters, the accumulated gradients and/or the velocities. Then, from a reduced number of training
iterations, T , we can estimate the hypergradients from the values of the parameters collected in the
set of states. Depending on the order to compute the operations we can differentiate two approaches
to estimate the hypergradients: Reverse-Mode (RMD) and Forward-Mode Differentiation (FMD)
[14, 10]. In the first case, RMD requires first to train the learning algorithm for T epochs, and then, to
compute s(0) to s(T ). Then, the hypergradients estimate is computed by reversing the steps followed
by the learning algorithm from s(T ) down to s(0). On the other hand, FMD computes the estimate
of the hypergradients as the algorithm is trained, i.e. from s(0) to s(T ) (i.e. the estimates can be
computed in parallel with the training procedure).
In some cases, as in [8], RMD requires to store all the information collected in the states in the
forward pass. This can be prohibitive in some cases as, for example, for deep networks where the
number of parameters is huge. However, other RMD methods proposed in the literature do not
require to store this information [22, 24]. To estimate the hypergradients, RMD requires to compute a
forward and a backward pass through the set of states. In contrast, FMD just needs to do the forward
computation. However, the scalability of FMD depends heavily on the number of hyperparameters
6The criterion to finish the loop that optimises the variables of the outer level problem is given by the number
of hyperiterations.
7The analysis of other techniques to accelerate the optimisation, such as adaptive learning rates, is left for
future work.
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Algorithm 2 Reverse-Mode Differentiation
Input:M, A, L, Dval, D′(τ)tr , Λ(τ), w(0), T , η
Output: ∇XpA
(
w(T )
)
1: for t = 0 to T − 1 do
2: g← ∇wL
(
w(t)
)
3: w(t+1) ← w(t) − ηg // stochastic gradient descent
4: end for
5: dX(T )p ← 0
6: dw(T ) ← ∇wA
(
w(T )
)
7: for t = T − 1 down to 0 do
8: dgw ←
(∇2wL (w(t))) dw(t+1) // Hessian-vector product (Appendix A)
9: dgXp ←
(∇Xp∇wL (w(t)))T dw(t+1) // Hessian-vector product (Appendix A)
10: dw(t) ← dw(t+1) − ηdgw
11: dX(t)p ← dX(t+1)p − ηdgXp
12: end for
13: ∇XpA
(
w(T )
)← dX(0)p
compared to RMD. Then, for problems where the number of hyperparameters is large, as it is the
case for the poisoning attacks we introduced in Sect. 3, RMD is computationally more efficient to
estimate the hypergradients. For this reason, we used RMD in our experiments.
Here we include the Reverse-Mode Differentiation (RMD) algorithm (Alg. 2) [8, 22, 24], which
we use to compute the hypergradient estimate at the outer level problem (both for the features of
the poisoning points, Xp, and the hyperparameters, Λ). We make use of a similar notation to the
algorithms presented in [22, 24]. The resulting algorithm for the case of Λ is analogous.
D Experimental Settings
In the following specifications, TDp denotes the number of hyperiterations at the outer problem when
the poisoning points are learned and λ is fixed, Tλ when the training set is clean and λ is learned, and
Tmul when Xp and λ are learned in a coordinate manner. Finally, ηtr is the learning rate when testing
the attack.
D.1 Architecture of the Models and Initialisation of Their Parameters
The Logistic Regression (LR) classifier’s parameters are always initialised with zeros, for all the
datasets.
In contrast, the Deep Neural Network (DNN) model—trained on ImageNet—has two hidden layers
(2, 048× 128× 32× 1) with Leaky ReLU activation functions (with a negative slope of 0.1), which
sums up to a total of 266, 433 parameters. These parameters are initially filled with values according
to the Xavier Initialisation method [12], using a uniform distribution for all the parameters except the
bias terms, which are initialised with a value of 10−2.
D.2 Synthetic Example
For the synthetic experiment shown in Sect. 4, we sample the attacker’s data from two bivariate
Gaussian distributions, N (µ0,Σ0) and N (µ1,Σ1), with mean vectors µi and covariance matrices
Σi for each class, i = 0, 1:
µ0 =
[−3.0
0.0
]
, Σ0 =
[
2.5 0.0
0.0 1.5
]
,
µ1 =
[
3.0
0.0
]
, Σ1 =
[
2.5 0.0
0.0 1.5
]
.
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Name # TrainingSamples
# Validation
Samples
# Test
Samples # Features
MNIST (‘0’ vs ‘8’) 512 171 1, 954 784
FMNIST (T-shirt vs pullover) 512 171 2, 000 784
ImageNet (dog vs fish) 512 171 600 2, 048
Table 1: Characteristics of the datasets used in the experiments.
Name TDp Tλ Tmul α β
MNIST (‘0’ vs ‘8’) (LR) 100 50 100 0.99 0.80
FMNIST (T-shirt vs pullover) (LR) 100 50 100 0.90 0.30
ImageNet (dog vs fish) (LR) 100 50 200 0.90 0.40
ImageNet (dog vs fish) (DNN) 100 75 150 0.99 0.03
Name Φ(Dp) Φ(λ) η T
MNIST (‘0’ vs ‘8’) (LR) [0.0, 1.0]784 [−8, log(200)] 0.10 150
FMNIST (T-shirt vs pullover) (LR) [0.0, 1.0]784 [−8, log(400)] 0.08 200
ImageNet (dog vs fish) (LR) [−0.5, 0.5]2,048 [−8, log(20, 000)] 0.05 200
ImageNet (dog vs fish) (DNN) [−0.5, 0.5]2,048 [−8, log(60)] 0.01 600
Table 2: Experimental settings for the poisoning attack.
Name ηtr Batch Size Number of Epochs
MNIST (‘0’ vs ‘8’) (LR) 10−2 64 200
FMNIST (T-shirt vs pullover) (LR) 10−2 64 200
ImageNet (dog vs fish) (LR) 10−3 64 300
ImageNet (dog vs fish) (DNN) 10−4 64 4, 000
Table 3: Experimental settings for training the models.
The attacker uses 32 points (16 per class) for training and 64 (32 per class) for validation, and
one poisoning point cloned from the validation set (in the example of Sect. 4, cloned from the set
labelled as blue), whose label is flipped. This poisoning point is concatenated into the training set
and the features of this point are optimised with RMD. In order to poison the LR classifier, we use
a learning rate and a number of hyperiterations for the poisoning point α = 0.4, TDp = 50; the
feasible domain Φ(Dp) ∈ [−9.5, 9.5]2; the learning rate and number of epochs for the inner problem
η = 0.2, T = 500; and when evaluating the attack, ηtr = 0.2, batch size = 32 (full batch), and
number of epochs = 100. When we apply regularisation, we fix λ = log(20) ≈ 3.
To plot the colour-map that shows the value of the regularisation hyperparameter learned (Fig. 1(right))
as a function of the poisoning point injected in the training set, the values of λ explored for each
possible poisoning point are in the range [−8, 6]. Then, the optimal value of λ is chosen such that it
minimises the error of the model, trained on each combination of the poisoning point (concatenated
into the training set) and λ in the grid, and evaluated on the validation set.
D.3 MNIST, FMNIST and ImageNet
In our experiments, all the results for MNIST ‘0’ vs ‘8’ [20], Fashion-MNIST (FMNIST) T-shirt
vs pullover [39], and ImageNet dog vs fish [33] (preprocessed as in [18]) are the average of 10
repetitions with different random data splits for training and validation, whereas the test set is fixed.
For all the attacks we measure the average test error for different attack strengths, where the number
of poisoning points is in the range between 0 and 85. To reduce the computational cost, the size of the
batch of poisoning points that are simultaneously optimised (as explained in Appendix B) is 17 for
all the datasets. This way, we simulate six different ratios of poisoning ranging from 0% to 16.6%.
The details of each dataset are included in Table 1. All the datasets are balanced. Moreover, both
MNIST and FMNIST sets are normalised to be in the range [0, 1]784, whereas for the ImageNet sets
we use the same Inception-v3 [37] features as in [18], and normalised them with respect to their
training mean and standard deviation.
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Figure 4: Average test false positive and false negative rate for LR. λRMD represents the one learned
with RMD. The first row represents the test false positive rate: (a) MNIST, (b) FMNIST, and
(c) ImageNet. The second row depicts the test false negative rate: (d) MNIST, (e) FMNIST, and
(f) ImageNet.
For all the experiments, we make use of stochastic gradient descent both to update the parameters
in the forward pass of RMD8 (full batch training), and to train the model when testing the attack
(mini-batch training). The details of the attack settings are shown in Table 2, whereas the ones for
training are in Table 3. Additionally, λCLEAN is optimised with 5-fold cross-validation—training
the model on the clean dataset, as in [38]. For all the datasets the ranges of values of λ explored to
compute λCLEAN is [−8, 1] (no better performance was observed for larger values of λ). On the other
hand, to accelerate the optimisation of λRMD, when the training set is clean these hyperparameters are
warm-started with a value λ = log(5) ≈ 1.61.
D.4 Details of the Hardware Used
All the experiments are run on 2 × 11 GB NVIDIA GeForce R© GTX 1080 Ti GPUs. The RAM
memory is 64 GB (4× 16 GB) Corsair VENGEANCE DDR4 3000 MHz. The processor (CPU) is
Intel R© CoreTM i7 Quad Core Processor i7-7700k (4.2 GHz) 8 MB Cache.
E Additional Results
E.1 Test False Positive and False Negative Rate
E.1.1 Logistic Regression
In Fig. 4 we represent the results for the test false positive and false negative rate for LR on MNIST,
FMNIST, and ImageNet. The results are consistent with the test error shown in Fig. 2(upper row):
The rates for λRMD lower bound the ones where regularisation is not applied (λ = −8), whose trend
8To refine the solutions obtained, when the poisoning points are learned and λ is fixed, and when the training
set is clean and λ is learned, if the optimisation algorithm gets stuck in a poor local optimum we restart the bilevel
optimisation procedure. In the case of the poisoning points, we reinitialise them with different values uniformly
sampled without duplicates from the validation set. For the regularisation hyperparameters, let λ(τ) denote their
latest value: We reinitialise them with values uniformly sampled in the range
[
λ(τ) − 0.5, λ(τ) + 0.5
]
. It is
however noteworthy that these reinitialisations were not crucial to obtain the results shown in this paper. The
exploration of warm-restart techniques in the case of multiobjective bilevel problems is left for future work.
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Figure 5: Average test false positive and false negative rate for the DNN on ImageNet. λRMD
represents the one learned with RMD: (a) Test false positive rate and (b) test false negative rate.
is very similar to the case of λCLEAN. For MNIST, the false positive rate for λRMD (Fig. 4(a)) is lower
than the one for the large value of λ until a 15% of poisoning points; the false negative rate for λRMD
(Fig. 4(d)) is lower than the one for the large regularisation term until a 2% of poisoning points, and
follows a similar trend from that point on. On the other side, for FMNIST, the false positive rate when
learning λ (Fig. 4(b)) is lower than the one for λ = log(400) when the fraction of poisoning points is
lower than 5%, and it reaches a maximum at around 10%, where it starts to decrease, being again
lower at approximately 15% of poisoning points; the false negative rate for λRMD (Fig. 4(e)) is lower
until a 2.5% of poisoning, and from then on it follows a similar pattern to the one for λ = log(400).
Finally, for ImageNet, the false positive rate when λ is learned (Fig. 4(c)) follows a very similar trend
to the one for λ = log(3, 000); in the case of the false negative rate (Fig. 4(f)), it is lower than the
one for the large regularisation term until a 3% of poisoning points, and from that point on it presents
a similar pattern.
E.1.2 Deep Neural Networks
In Fig. 5 we depict the results for the test false positive and false negative rate for the DNN
on ImageNet. The results present a similar trend to the test error (Fig. 3(a)), as again the rates
corresponding to λ = −8 are lower bounded by the ones for λRMD. The false positive rate for λRMD
(Fig. 5(a)) appears to be greater than the plot corresponding to λ = log(40), which does not seem
affected by the attack. Regarding the false negative rate for λRMD (Fig. 5(b)), it is lower than the
one for λ = log(40) until a 5% of poisoning points, and after a roughly 10% of poisoning points it
slightly decreases when the fraction of poisoning points increases, until a 16.6% of poisoning points,
where it becomes equal to the one for the strong regularisation term.
E.2 Histograms of the Models’ Parameters
E.2.1 Logistic Regression
In Fig. 6 we represent the histogram of the values of the parameters, w, of the LR classifier on
MNIST, FMNIST and ImageNet, when the training sets are clean (blue bars) and when a 16.6% of
each training set is replaced by poisoning points (orange bars). To appreciate better the distribution
of the parameters, we omit the upper part of some plots. The first row depicts the cases when no
regularisation is applied, and the second row shows the case where λ is learned using RMD. We
can clearly appreciate the effect of the regularisation: For all the datasets, the range of values of the
parameters (blue bars of the second row) is narrowed down, and when the attacker injects poisoning
points, this forces the model to compress more these values (orange bars of the second row) close to 0,
as the value of λ increases. This leads to a more stable model under possible malicious manipulations
of the training data.
E.2.2 Deep Neural Networks
In Fig. 7 we represent the histogram of the values of the parameters of the DNN classifier on
ImageNet, for the clean dataset (blue bars) and when a 16.6% of the training set is replaced by
poisoning points (orange bars). The first, second, and third column show the results for the first
hidden, second hidden, and output layer, correspondingly. The first row depicts the cases where no
regularisation is applied, and the second row when λ is learned using RMD. Once again, we can
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Figure 6: Histograms (in terms of relative frequency) of the LR’s parameters. For a better visualisation,
the upper part of some subfigures has been omitted. The first row represents the case where no
regularisation is applied: (a) MNIST, (b) FMNIST, and (c) ImageNet. The second row shows the
case where λ is learned with RMD: (d) MNIST, (e) FMNIST, and (f) ImageNet.
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Figure 7: Histograms (in terms of relative frequency) of the DNN’s parameters on ImageNet. The
first row represents the case where regularisation is not applied: (a) first hidden layer, (b) second
hidden layer, and (c) output layer. The second row shows the corresponding results when λ is learned
with RMD: (a) first hidden layer, (b) second hidden layer, and (c) output layer.
appreciate the effect of the regularisation: For all the layers, the range of values of the parameters
(blue bars of the second row) is narrowed down, and when the attacker poisons the training data, this
forces the model to bound more these values (orange bars of the second row), as the corresponding
values of λ for each layer increase.
18
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 8: Examples of poisoning points computed with RMD for the LR classifier on MNIST:
(a) initial features, (b) features optimised for λ = −8, and (c) features optimised for λRMD.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 9: Examples of poisoning points computed with RMD for the LR classifier on FMNIST:
(a) initial features, (b) features optimised for λ = −8, and (c) features optimised for λRMD.
E.3 Examples of Poisoning Points Computed
Here we depict the image representation of poisoning points randomly sampled across different
fractions of poisoning. These points are computed with RMD for the LR classifier on MNIST
(Fig. 8) and FMNIST (Fig. 9), respectively. For both datasets we represent the initial values
of the features of the poisoning points and their optimised values for the cases where there is no
regularisation (λ = −8), and when λ is learned (λRMD). We do not include examples for ImageNet
as we use the same Inception-v3 features as in [18], so that each of the images is represented by a
2, 048-dimensional vector that does not have an obvious representation in the image domain.
For MNIST, we can observe that the optimised points present a similar pattern for the cases where
λ = −8 and when λ is learned. For FMNIST, they also present a similar representation in most of the
cases, although when the attack is strong—i.e. the ratio of poisoning points is large—the solutions
obtained when λ is learned present more saturated features, which could be more detectable for the
human perception. In other words, in this case the poisoning attack against the classifier learning the
regularisation term requires increasing the level of perturbation in the malicious examples, which can
make the attack more detectable.
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